


Export Controls and Sanctions Controlled Unclassified Information Research Protection and Undue Influence

Dan Runge Export Compliance and Assistant Research Integrity Officer Office of Research Integrity and Safety RADG - 29 July 2019

Just Because you say it, doesn't make it so. Fundamental Research






Export Controls

- U.S. laws and regulations that govern the transfer of controlled items or information to foreign nationals, countries, and entities for reasons of national security and foreign policy
- Sponsored research may be subject to Export Controls





Economic and Trade Sanctions



 Prohibitions on transactions with restricted and/or sanctioned individuals, entities, countries, or economic sectors




Export Controls What Do We Want to Avoid?

- Doing export controlled, or otherwise restricted research, (or engaging with sanctioned entities) without a compliance framework in place
 - Why?
 - Breach of contract
 - Violations of federal regulations
 - PI and/or the institution may not want/be able to handle the restrictions associated with the project
 - Work involving "Controlled Unclassified Information" typically requires extensive information security and cyber incident reporting
 - Export controlled and non-fundamental research require "Technology Control Plans"




EC Qs – Proposal Smartform

Basic Proposal Information (page 2 of 2)






EC Qs - Proposal Smartform Additional Personnel (page 1 of 1)






EC Qs – Proposal Smartform Compliances





Highest Risk Sponsors







Higher Risks Sponsors Currently Subject to ECR

- CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
- DEFENCE ADVANCD RSCH PROJ AGCY
- NATIONAL AERO & SPACE ADMIN
- NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
- NATL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE
- OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY
- US AGENCY FOR INATL DEVEL
- US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
- US DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
- US DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- US DEPT OF AIR FORCE
- US DEPT OF ARMY
- US DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
- US DEPT OF NAVY
- US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM
- UT-BATTELLE LLC
- CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL



What Does Dan Need to Know and When Does He Want to Know It? Higher Risk Sponsors Edition

 The Grants Portal generates a notification to the ECO when a project involves a Higher Risk Sponsor (prior to or concurrent with) submission of Proposal



Dear Export Control Reviewer,

Funding Proposal FP00018072 contains the following information related to Export Control review:

Will items or technical data identified as export controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (on the United States Munitions List (USML)) be accessed, used, or developed as part of the proposed activities? If not explicitly subject to the ITAR/USML will SPACE or MILITARY equipment, software, materials, or technical data be accessed, used or developed as part of the proposed activities? Will Select Agents or Toxins be accessed or used?

No

If "Yes" or "Not Sure", please explain:

Prime Sponsor: US Department Of Defense

Prime Sponsor Export Control Review Needed:

(X)(X)Yes ()()No

Originating Sponsor:

Originating Sponsor Export Control Needed: ()()Yes ()()No

If you have any questions, please contact the Sponsored Projects Administration: https://spa.uga.edu/contact/



What Does Dan Need to Know and When Does He Want to Know It? Proposal Smartform Edition

- If the Export Control Compliance question is marked "Yes" or "Not Sure" on the Proposal Smartform:
 - Grants Portal Notification to ECO
- If Foreign Locations or Parties are Indicated on the Proposal Smartform:
 - Grants Portal Notification to ECO



Dear Export Control Reviewer,

Funding Proposal FP00018151 contains the following information related to Export Control review:

Will items or technical data identified as export controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (on the United States Munitions List (USML)) be accessed, used, or developed as part of the proposed activities? If not explicitly subject to the ITAR/USML will SPACE or MILITARY equipment, software, materials, or technical data be accessed, used or developed as part of the proposed activities? Will Select Agents or Toxins be accessed or used?

Not Sure

If "Yes" or "Not Sure", please explain:

Prime Sponsor: National Aero & Space Admin

Prime Sponsor Export Control Review Needed:

(X)(X)Yes ()()No

Originating Sponsor:

Originating Sponsor Export Control Needed: ()() Yes ()() No

If you have any questions, please contact the Sponsored Projects Administration: https://spa.uga.edu/contact/



Funding Proposal: FP00018095

Funding Proposal Novel Statistical Methods for Deciphering the Regulatory

Name: Role of Small RNAs

Principal Investigator

Name:

Ping Ma

Sponsor: National Institutes Of Health

Dear Dan Runge,

The Funding Proposal was submitted with the following information

Primary Sponsor: National Institutes Of Health

Originating Sponsor:

Are any foreign Locations being used in the project? [X][X]

Details of the foreign locations:

country	dateCreated	dateModified	ID	metaCloneId	type
CHN: CHINA	5/14/2019	5/14/2019	ID00001455		Conference

Are there any foreign parties involved in the project: [][]

Details of foreign parties:

Country(i	dateCreat	dateModifi	ı	metaClone	Name(Organization	Role(
es)	ed	ed	D	Id	s)	(s)	s)

There are no items to display



ECO Review Process

- Process After Proposal Notifications
 - Review
 - Proposal
 - Review of RFP/BAA/Solicitation
 - Review of proposal and SOW
 - Discussions with PI, if necessary
 - While ECO receives Portal generated notifications, pre-award and DLSA staff may also reach out to share any proposal concerns, as the proposal notifications are sent close to/at submission
 - Notes in Portal Project History on Proposals



Other Export Control Issues

- International Shipping
 - No centralized process... Contact ECO
 - ECO works with SPA, Procurement, Biosafety, Innovation Gateway, ESD to identify controlled items and international shipments/transfers
- International Travel
 - Travelers must complete OGE Travel Registry
- Any activity involving Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine
- Visiting Researchers and Scholars
 - Follow UGA Immigration Services and Visiting Research Scholar Questionnaire processes
- Procurement

Controlled Unclassified Information and Related Information Security Requirements

- Export controlled research/information is also considered Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or Covered Defense Information (CDI)
- CUI and CDI typically have information security requirements (NIST SP 800-171) that are onerous and not currently* in place at UGA
- BAA/RFP/Contracts with these terms and compliance requirements (which may be independent of export controls) cannot be executed without review and approval within the Export Control Review process, which also includes working with Matt Wells Office of Research Legal Advisor.





Federal Research Protection and Undue "Foreign Influence" Concerns







https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/04/16/federal-granting-agencies-and-lawmakers-step-scrutiny-foreign-research





Research Protection and Undue "Foreign Influence" Concerns: NIH

- Diversion of intellectual property in grant applications
- Sharing of confidential information on grant applications by peer reviewers with others, including foreign entities
- Sponsored Research Current/Pending Support
 - Failure to disclose resources from other organizations, including foreign governments
- July "reminder" from NIH regarding what constitutes current and pending support





DoD "Actions for the Protection of Intellectual Property, Controlled Information, Key Personnel and Critical Technologies"

- "Proposers shall submit...information for all key personnel, whether or not the individuals' efforts under the project are to be funded by the DoD...
 - To support protection of IP, controlled information, key personnel, and information about critical technologies relevant to national security
 - To limit undue influence, including through foreign talent programs, by countries to exploit US technology within DOD research, science and technology, and innovation enterprise
- Updated disclosure of support basically mirrors existing NIH, etc current/pending support disclosure requirements





"Foreign Talent Recruitment" Programs

- Not necessarily clear what federal agency's definitions are for these programs, but "Thousand Talents" is one of them that is publicly known
- Heightened risk countries: China, Iran, North Korea, Russia
- Emphasis on accurate current/pending support disclosures also aimed at capturing this type of program participation
- NSF personnel and Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) participants cannot participate in these programs
 - Also reemphasized existing requirements to disclose current and pending support information
- Department of Energy employees and contractors cannot participate in these programs
 - Grants related guidance on these programs is to come
 - Also developing "risk matrix" with regard to emerging research areas, technology, and certain countries



UGA's Approach

- SPA and DLSA staff should encourage full transparency and disclosure on current/pending support and be aware of changes communicated from SPA senior leadership
- Office of Research Integrity and Safety is developing training presentation for faculty and improving Conflicts of Interest in Sponsored Programs Policy and related process
- Bottom Line: UGA is supportive of global engagement, wants to make sure we support our faculty that engage internationally and provide good guidance and resources on meeting federal expectations related to these concerns. UGA values foreign partnerships and exchanges.






Dan Runge, J.D., LL.M.

Export Compliance Officer
Assistant Research Integrity Officer
drunge@uga.edu | 2-4188

Tucker 208



research.uga.edu/export-control